Friday, December 12, 2008

(A degree of) justice is done

Jurors in the inquest into the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes have returned an open verdict – the most severe verdict that could be given after the coroner ruled that a verdict of ‘unlawful killing’ could not be given in the case.

Jean Charles de Menezes was an innocent Brazilian man living in London who was shot half a dozen times by armed police officers on a tube train at Stockwell station in south London in the panicky days just after the July 7 bombings. When the event occurred, the Metropolitan police announced that they had killed another suspected terrorist. However, over the subsequent days, it became clear that he was entirely innocent. The police continued to circulate rumours that he had been behaving erratically, was wearing a jacket that looked to be obscuring an explosive belt, and that he had leapt over the ticket barriers and sprinted away from the police when they’d tried to stop him at the top of the station entrance. None of these claims turned out to be true.

Asked a series of questions about the events, the jurors concluded that the officers had failed to shout the required warning – “armed officer” – in advance of shooting Jean Charles; that whilst he had stood up from his seat, he had not walked towards the officers (as they’d claimed); and that the following factors had all contributed to the mix-up that led to the decision to kill him:

  • A failure to obtain good photographic evidence in advance.
  • A failure to stop Jean Charles before he reached the tube station.
  • The failure to communicate correctly the views of surveillance officers to the command team and firearms officers.
  • The failure of the command team to know accurately where the cars containing the firearms officers were.
  • A general failure in communications.
  • A failure of judgement in not using surveillance officers to stop Jean Charles before entering the station when it became clear that firearms officers would not be able to.
The event was a tragic product of a time when the whole nation was terrified. The people who pulled the weapon were under the impression that Jean Charles de Menezes was a suicide bomber about to kill hundreds of people. The mistake will no doubt live with them for life. But whilst it explains, none of this excuses these horrible events: part of one of the darkest periods of recent history for Londoners. Even more worrying, all the officers involved were allowed to speak to and debrief each other for a day before they were interrogated by investigators. In that time, they got their story straight, making it next to impossible to ever know the whole truth of what happened.

And let’s not forget either, that these attacks were designed as a direct response to the British decision, right or wrong, to invade Iraq – something that then Prime Minster Tony Blair explicitly and disingenuously denied.

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Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Tony vs. Rod

The Daily Beast has a great game on its site. Guess from a series of ten whether the phrase was (allegedly) said by Rod Blagojevich or Tony Soprano...

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Tuesday, December 09, 2008

The Auto Bailout

The financial bailout made me uneasy because so few conditions appeared to be attached to the money; the auto bailout is making me uneasy because so many seem to be attached. This sounds contradictory. But let me try and explain myself...

Paulson's priority with the financial bailout was to act swiftly and decisively, in the hope that the implicit security provided by promises of state protection would encourage banks to start lending to each other again, and that all the toxic debt could be pulled together and removed from the system like some sort of malignant pustule. This, it was argued, would allow the United States (and the world) to avoid the kind of prolonged depression that Japan suffered in the 1990s. Moral hazard - the fear that such bailouts were sending a message rewarding failure - was put to one side, as the emergency was considered too big for such matters to apply. The question of reforming the system was also put to one side, on the basis that "right now we need to put the fire out, and can worry about what started the fire later."

At the time, I argued that we should support the bailout, but attach conditions immediately. Once the crisis is over, the impetus for meaningful reform of the financial sector, to control the way in which bankers took risks with the international system, would vanish, too. We'd see a return to the bad old ways of yore. Nothing since then, not least the astonishing attempts by unapologetic magnates to hand themselves incredible bonuses, has caused me to think differently. Since the passage of the bill, absolutely nothing has even been suggested about reforming the financial sector. Meanwhile, the complete lack of control over the $700bn handed over has led Paulson to abandon the original plan to isolate and remove the toxic debts, which remain on the balance sheet, in place of other emergency measures. The excessively risky practices, off-balance sheet debts and so on remain in operation, just as they did after Enron. The LIBOR rate remains sky-high. And instead of creating an image of decisive action from the Treasury, the seemingly random and erratic pattern of response has instead given the impression of an unprepared, panicky team who have no real idea what's wrong with the patient or how to fix it.

The auto bailout should be seen in part as the consequence of this original panicky thinking, a classic example of contagious moral hazard. Once the state accepted the principle that sector-critical institutions would receive unprecedented support without conditions, it was hardly surprising that the auto CEOs would jump into their Lear jets for D.C. and start demanding that the government pay out. What other sectors will follow the car builders, I wonder?

But that's actually the least of the problems involved with bailing out the Big Three, and in truth, given the vital importance of the financial bailout it was probably inevitable. What is much more problematic for the long term is that the kind of money about to be pumped into Michigan is rewarding one of the least efficient and least internationally competitive industrial sectors of the American economy, instead of investing precious tax receipts in making new jobs for the next century. Newsflash: no-one buys American cars outside the Americas ... why is that?

Aware that they're rewarding failure, congress has instead opted to meddle in matters of corporate management. This makes sense inasmuch as it's the only way of mandating reform if you don't let the market do its job through bankruptcy. But it makes no sense in the bigger picture, because in the long run congresspeople have neither the time nor the expertise to make the right decisions about the future of the auto sector. Auto bailouts in the UK and elsewhere in the past reveal the same thing, time and time and time again: years down the line, the failed companies remain failures, and more money is inevitably called for. We've been down this road before, and nobody - and certainly not the worker on the production line - wins.

The UAW and others argue that the bailout matters more in the auto sector, because 'real people' are involved, unlike the bankers who suffered in the financial sector, who will have to retreat to their islands in the sun and corporate tax havens to recover. Of course, we're all sympathetic to this argument. Nobody gives two hoots about the richest people in the world, especially when they're people who got us into this mess in the first place. Frankly, we should start taking the money back from the financiers, if you ask me.

But there's two important points to make here. One: the financial bailout was never about helping the bankers. It was about reopening the supply of credit to businesses across the country who were in the process of going bust because they couldn't get short term access to debt. These were 'real people' too, even if they weren't all part of a union that could buy national press headlines. Two: helping the 'real people' about to be put out of work in Detroit isn't necessarily achieved best by rewarding the businessmen who've failed to keep them in competitive jobs for more than thirty years. Why not target the money directly at the workers who are about to lose out, instead, or give it to businesses that are growing and want to take on new workers and retrain old auto workers? Training programmes, job creation schemes, subsidies for the purchase of fuel efficient cars, subsidies for unemployed people experiencing foreclosures on their houses: spending the state's money in these ways goes straight to the 'people' without having to pass it through the pockets of failed businessmen (who'll no doubt keep a hefty chunk for themselves). In short, spend $50bn if you need to, but do it in ways that allow the failed businesses to reform or die, and instead act to minimise the cost to the innocent workers who in good faith worked for them and yet are paying the price for other peoples' failures...

So that's why the auto bailout worries me. It's a lot of money, and I doubt that in the long run it's going to work. And it surprises me that the home of ruthless capitalism, the United States, seems so unwilling to apply its own basic principles to its treasured, yet almost dead, automobile industry.

Here's my theory: most Congresspeople know how an engine works, so they think that they know how the auto sector should work. As a result, they think they can do a better job of it, tinker around with the nuts and bolts, and end up perpetuating a failing economic model, like an Oldsmobile on its last legs that, for sentimental reasons, the owner isn't willing to put out of its misery. Meanwhile, most of them haven't a clue what a collateralised debt obligation is, so they just hand over the money to the bankers and let them get on with the business of buying themselves brand new Porsches.

Am I the only person to whom this doesn't make sense?

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Sunday, December 07, 2008

Anarchism and terrorism

In response to my recent comparison between modern international terrorism and social banditry, Peter at Vukutu suggested two further historical comparisons to think about: turn of the 20th century anarchism and Catholic recusancy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Knowing next to nothing about the latter, I will have to restrain my comments to the first of these (and offer the warning that this is all pretty much spontaneous writing, and so is undoubtedly liable to inaccuracies).

The anarchist movement of the late nineteenth century emerged primarily in Europe, though it is possible to see intellectual precursors in the Americas (Thoreau, etc.). Inspired by thinkers like Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Peter Kropotkin, most anarchists tended towards a radical distrust of the state (considering it a vehicle for the interests of the ruling classes), hostility towards the private ownership and inheritance of property, and held utopian aspirations to order society in a radically decentralised manner, with the absence of organising hierarchies.

There were, of course, many variants – with some people calling for collective ownership of the means of production and others disagreeing. But all generally shared a belief that direct democracy would have to be fought for in the streets; and most advocated confrontational action through trade unions to assert the autonomy of the labourer in the industrial workplace. As a modification of anarchism focused even more heavily on the unions, anarcho-syndicalist groups sprang up in many developed nations in the late nineteenth century, especially France, Spain, and the United States (the Industrial Workers of the World).

Most of the larger, union-oriented anarcho-syndicalist groups were militant and not afraid of confrontation, but tended to concern themselves with working class uplift, rather than committing acts of violence. The IWW advocated what it called ‘sabotage’ (and its enemies called ‘terrorism’), which meant the destruction of industrial machinery most of the time. However, a smaller number of anarchist advocates – in the United States, the most famous example was Emma Goldman – argued that violent attacks on the ruling elite were not only legitimate, but also essential in developing a revolutionary consciousness amongst the workers. The ‘propaganda of the deed’ would, so to speak, speak a thousand words.

Most of the time, this meant killing the rich and the powerful by gun and by dynamite – a view that did not necessarily differ from the attitudes of some radical republicans at the time. However, over time this initial focus on society’s most powerful people degenerated into fairly arbitrary bombings of symbolically significant locations, which tended to kill innocent people rather than their plutocratic enemies. Self-serving justifications to one side, at root this tactical shift came about because the masses were easier targets than the elites.

In their time, anarchists or anarchist-inspired radicals were involved in assassination of a series of important national leaders, including Umberto I of Italy in 1900, George I of Greece, and President McKinley. In the United States, Alexander Berkman (latterly Emma Goldman’s long term partner) tried and failed to assassinate the millionaire Henry Clay Frick. Meanwhile, anarchists were almost certainly responsible for the abortive wave of parcel bombs dispatched to several dozen houses of important political leaders in the summer of 1919, the event that sparked off the Great Red Scare.

By the 1920s, however, the ineffectiveness of political assassinations as a technique for achieving radical social change had become fairly clear, and anarchism’s appeal waned, especially in the United States and Western Europe. Anarchism retained influence in Spain, where it played an important role in resisting the forces of General Franco during the Civil War of the 1930s, and in Mexico, and elsewhere in Latin America.

So, does the international anarchist movement work as a good comparison for contemporary terrorism, particularly Islamism...? And what useful lessons might be learned?

Firstly, what similarities does anarchism have to contemporary terrorism?

  1. It advocates murder as a method of political action.
  2. Carefully-justified theories about tyranny tended over time to degenerate into much vaguer and more aggressive attacks on the symbols of organized society, as it became harder and harder to get access to initial targets.
  3. Anarchists were a loosely-affiliated group of individuals who shared a particular ideology but were not tightly tied into a rigid organizational bureaucracy. This made the movement as a whole notoriously difficult to eradicate.
  4. Most anarchists were ‘transnational’ actors, many of them drifted between nations and regions as dispossessed and propertyless individuals, and most considered themselves 'citizens of the world', not containing their aspirations or actions to a single state or national territory.
And what differences are there between anarchism and contemporary terrorism? Well, many, but I think the critical one to stress is the fact that anarchism formed part – a radical, dissenting part, but nevertheless a part – of the humanist tradition of western thinking, whilst modern fundamentalist Islam is essentially anti-humanist, based upon revelation rather than reason as the true source of value and meaning. This may turn out to have significant repercussions in terms of how Islamism responds to the growing crisis it faces, but I personally suspect that there is and has always been much more room for interpretation in Islam than is commonly assumed.

I’ll try and add more to this some other time, but for now let’s focus on the key question: why and how did anarchism decline? There were many factors, but I think three were particularly important:
  1. State repression. To take the US example, the First World War and post-war scare produced a new activist mentality at the federal level, leading to the arrest and deportation of several leading anarchists (including Goldman and Berkman), and the suppression of anarchist newspapers. At a lower level, police and state authorities made being an anarchist next to impossible through the vigorous application of legal and extralegal punishments (from beating up union organizers and running them out of town, to arresting them for ‘disturbing the peace’ or similar). New laws were passed that allowed for the deportation of people for advocating violence (or sometimes even simply belonging to a revolutionary group) rather than actually having committed a criminal activity. In some cases, this produced a backlash against the state (the cause celebre of two falsely-executed anarchists, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, for instance, was a major source of recruitment amongst left-wing groups well into the 1930s and beyond.) However, this backlash did not tend to increase membership in anarchist movements per se, only amongst reformist organizations. (In fact, the Communist Party of the USA was one of the chief beneficiaries of the Sacco-Vanzetti affair.) It appears that, right or wrong, brutal suppression achieved its short term goal here.
  2. The rise of communism. As an alternative ideology, and one that – after 1917 – could point to Soviet Russia as an example of material success, communism appeared significantly more logical to radicals looking for a philosophy in the interwar years. People who were furious with the system, and who would have joined an anarchist movement in 1900, joined the various international communist parties in the 1920s and 1930s. Anarchism, by contrast, could point to no meaningful successes. Where anarchistic ideas did have some influence – during the Mexican Revolution, for instance – they were largely sidelined when the ultimate solutions were negotiated. In short, anarchism didn’t work.
  3. It had the rug taken out from underneath it. The immediate response to most anarchist attacks was a strengthening of reactionary sentiment and the clamping down on dissent. But over the course of thirty or forty years – in fact, largely independently of the anarchist movement – many of the ideas that had been important reasons why anarchists first took up their calling, became much more accepted within the mainstream of society. By 1930, you didn’t need to be a radical anarchist to advocate birth control, liberalised divorce practices, social and sexual equality, rights to unionise, and anti-imperialism. In fact, you could say all these things and call yourself a liberal, such was the pace of change in modern society.
Taken together, these three factors made anarchism as a political method extremely costly, yet largely ineffective, and yet paradoxically less necessary as time went on.

This suggests to me that the collapse of Islamism will probably be built upon similar dynamics. I expect a continuation and expansion of the aggressive repression of Islamism by states around the world, and probably a continuation of interdictions, targeted assassinations, and kidnappings of Islamist leaders. Already we are seeing factional disputes emerging within the Islamist world over the efficacy of bombing, especially of bombing ordinary citizens, especially those living in largely Islamic regions like Iraq (Al Qaeda effectively declaring all those who do not agree with their philosophy to be infidels, Islamic in name or not, and often veiling an anti-Shia chauvinism within their arcane theories of jihad). The repression and other responses of modern states have made it far harder to successfully attack powerful symbolic locations or groups, and so Islamists have now turned their attention on ‘soft’ targets – subways, train stations, hotels. These offer the potential for worldwide news headlines, but they fundamentally undermine the liberatory agenda that brought people to the Islamist movement in the first place.

These processes are clearly already in motion, though one would expect them to be accelerated over the next decade. (Remember, by the way, that anarchist assassinations and bombings stretched over a period of more than forty years.) However, so far effort has been overwhelmingly directed towards point one only. We have not seen political developments in the Islamic world that would make it less appealing and less necessary for passionately motivated individuals to turn to violence; nor have we seen the emergence of alternative Islamic movements that seem to offer a more effective route of protest. This would seem to suggest what most of us know instinctively already: that peace in our time requires an opening of political debate, movement towards democracy and pluralistic civil society in all parts of the world, and the development and diversification of Middle Eastern national economies.

But the problem is that the systems of rule in states like Arabia are so ossified that any attempt to reform would run the risk of revolutionary collapse, and so the western powers – petrified – remain stubbornly allied with and supportive of unreconstructed dictators.

Moreover, the Bush Administration was singularly unconcerned with this third component of the matrix. This was because its philosophy was built on the simplistic view that anything other than staunch opposition to all things Al Qaeda called for would be considered ‘giving in to terrorism’. Only drawing lines in the sand and defending allies were considered valid methods of fighting the war on terror (though we have seen some changes in Iraq under Petraeus). So whilst we’ve seen an effective defence of US national territory in the last eight years, Islamists continued to gain recruits in Western Europe and elsewhere, and we have seen more bombings in London, Madrid, and Bombay, to name but the three most horrendous and brutal examples.

Writing this summary, I come to the conclusion that none of these factors alone will be sufficient to eliminate Islamic terrorism; only their combination will do that. Liberals are mistaken if they think the conflict can be won without fighting the enemy; conservatives are mistaken if they think that only fighting will produce victory. Until we combine the war-making components of the fight against Islamism with a vigorous attempt to make their case for membership redundant by pulling the rug out from under them, we won’t see an end to this destructive blight upon our modern society.

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Saturday, December 06, 2008

10 quick fixes

Of course, the big things are going to take a lot of work: devising an exit strategy from Iraq that doesn’t end up the plunging the nation into civil war or dictatorship; providing universal health care coverage; reviving the economy from the worst depression in the best part of a century; rebuilding America’s reputation in the world; shifting to a low-carbon economy and ending dependence on oil. There’ll be tough jobs and if Obama can get even the majority of them done during his administration, he’ll be assured of a place in history.

Nevertheless, there’s a bunch of things that the new administration can do which cost relatively little, could be passed relatively easily through a Democratic congress or by executive order, would require the expenditure of only minimal amounts of political capital, and would have a dramatic effect in demonstrating that a new era had begun in D.C.

So without further ado, here’s a list of my suggestions, ten quick fixes that the Obama administration can do in its first hundred days to achieve maximum results with minimum pain:

1. Close Guantánamo Bay, transfer the key Al Qaeda operatives to domestic prison facilities pending prosecution, and release the rest.

2. Pass an amendment banning all CIA employees from using practices that go beyond the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation (thereby removing their exemption to torture, waterboard, etc.).

3. Declare a second ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, in which intervention in the internal politics of democratic nations is explicitly disavowed. (And while you’re at it, stop funding anti-Morales opposition groups in Bolivia.)

4. Repeal George Bush’s ban on stem cell research.

5. Declare an explicit goal of leading the process of constructing Kyoto II. Even without action, such a declaration would itself encourage many business firms to continue to gear up for large scale alternative energy investment.

6. Sign up to the Convention on Cluster Munitions accord (see previous post).

7. Reintroduce funding for contraceptive programmes into the US programmes for AIDS reduction in Africa.

8. Distribute 20 million insecticide-treated mosquito nets to children in the most heavily malaria-infected regions of sub-saharan Africa (approximate cost, $100m – or 0.00004% of the national budget).

9. Pass a law requiring all citizens earning more than $500,000 a year to spend at least a week every year working in a soup kitchen. (Ok, maybe this is a bit unlikely, but just imagine...!)

10. Pass a law prohibiting invasive scientific testing on all non-human primates.

Feel free to add your own suggestions to the list!

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Thursday, December 04, 2008

Every now and then it's worth having a little faith in people

92 (and rising) countries have signed up to an international ban on the use of cluster bombs in Oslo, yesterday. Once again, Scandinavia proves its greatest export is (no, not cellphones) peace.

I was in Laos about eight or nine years ago, and I got to see first-hand what impact these bombs could have, and speak to a guy who was working with the Mines Advisory Group over there trying to spot and destroy these disgusting weapons (along with other munitions still blighting the Laos countryside thirty years after the end of the Vietnam war). The reality is truly horrific. Because the bombs fragment into hundreds of small, ball-shaped 'bomblets', they are particularly destructive towards civilians. The bomblets can lay in the ground for years after the conflict has finished. Children in particular prove vulnerable, because they see the ball-shaped objects and, not knowing any better, try and play with them, only to get a limb blown off.

No weapon is a good thing, but these bombs are particularly gruesome in their design and function.

The only catch is the usual catch. The biggest manufacturers - Russia, China and the US - have all refused to sign up. The Bush Administration has implausibly claimed that signing up to the ban will "put the lives of our military men and women, and those of our coalition partners, at risk." No, Mr. Bush, invading and occupying foreign countries is what puts your soldiers' lives at risk. These bombs put everyone else's lives at risk...

So: another item to add to the list of quick and easy fixes that the Obama administration can do to improve its reputation in the world, and - more than that - actually bring about some good. Sign up in January and save some lives!

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Wednesday, December 03, 2008

Shifting the tanker

Further evidence that changing the course of the supertanker of state is not easy for any captain, the New York Times reports this morning that the selection for Director of the CIA is proving a little bit of a headache for President-elect Obama. Preferred choice and bureaucratic insider, John O. Brennan, has been kiboshed due to his links to the CIA during the last eight years of shameful misbehaviour. A retired intelligence guy says that this decision has created anxiety amongst the CIA ranks that "if you worked in the C.I.A. during the war on terror, you are now tainted."

So what?, you might say. Certainly, there isn't anything wrong in principle with letting people know that if they commit crimes, even under the orders of a delinquent president, that these might continue to blot their copybook after the delinquent has moved back to Crawford. Perhaps this might persuade career intelligence agents to think twice in future about the wisdom of obeying orders to torture people. (Moreover, appointing 'the best man' instead of a loyal ally in the case of the policing arms doesn't always work out too well: Clinton's George H. W. Bush holdover, Louis Freeh, at the FBI was a bit of a disaster, for instance.)

The moral case for reform is clear. But the problem is that the CIA isn't going to go away just because it's been sent to the doghouse, and change may not arrive most quickly by taking an adversarial attitude to a large and subtly-powerful institution. Rumsfeld's war on the army, trying to force reform through by harassment, is a textbook example of how not to engineer change in a large institution. Any director will require at least some goodwill to ensure that a notoriously independent agency doesn't go off and start doing things on its own. Truman and Eisenhower created a beast that was intentionally free from external oversight, and despite the best efforts of congressional reformists in the 1970s it substantially remains that way.

Obama's strategy with the arms of the executive so far seems to have been to try to co-opt them with trusted insiders, and presumably to bring them along in any reform aspirations. Selecting an outsider may turn out to be the best thing in this case - they'll have the benefit of not being tainted by the agency's reputation to date. But they'll have to be twice as good to earn the support of the agency they're supposed to be running...

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Tuesday, December 02, 2008

Right or wrong, Obama will bomb

Joan Didion and Darryl Pinckney face off in the latest New York Review of Books, Didion suspicious of Obamamania, Pinckney undoubtedly in the grip of it. I must confess I felt for both arguments, but there was one paragraph in particular in Pinckney's comments that made me realise that expectations have now got well out of control:

The election of Senator Obama to the presidency signals our return to a nation whose government respects law and order. As president, Obama could put an end to the technological banditry of missions over Syria and Afghanistan designed to target our enemies and then to take them out with missiles, as in the climactic scene of George Clooney's film Syriana. It has actually happened that the target turned out to have been a wedding and US officials denied that the casualties were civilian and then apologized for those casualties once it was pretty clear that they had been civilian. President Obama could renounce shock and awe, the shortsighted policy that resulted from the proposition that a war can be largely won without having to commit ground troops. He could also bring us back to the idea that the Geneva Conventions are a good thing. President Obama will certainly save the Supreme Court and therefore the US Constitution. The integrity of our institutions has been guaranteed, restored.
Respect for law and order. Tick. Support for the Geneva convention. Tick. Liberal appointments to the Supreme Court bench. Tick. No more use of remote bombing... erm, what?! You think so? Do you really think so? That Obama is going to renounce the use of a military tool which has proven to be one of the most effective in the modern era because it exposes the United States to virtually no risk of human casualties? A tool that he's more or less explicitly said he'll use against a US ally, Pakistan, if he gets the chance to take out senior Al Qaeda operatives? And do you really think that committing ground troops instead of "shock and awe" is a guaranteed way of avoiding civilian casualties and winning hearts and minds? My Lai, anybody? Falluja?

I'm not trying to say that it's a good thing that the US bombs people from afar. But it defies all conceptions of political reality to believe that there's a nice way of subjecting a regime and killing its people. It also defies all evidence to assume that Obama is, deep down, a member of a leftist semi-pacifist group that won't ever push the button on cruise missiles and doesn't believe in the maintenance of American power. Clinton bombed - because it allowed him to project US power without seeing more Black Hawks down - and he managed to take out a medicinal factory in Sudan because of it. Bush criticized him for being ineffective in 2000, then he did the same thing for most of the next eight years. He combined this with more boots on the ground; and that didn't work out too well, either, Mr. Pinckney.

When it comes to the next crunch time, Obama will drop bombs, too. I worry that some people have been so blinded by the manifest disaster of the last administration that they have lost all sense of the continuities in American history which defy the change of leadership at the top. There are bigger things than just being a nice guy, and one of those bigger things is the infrastructure and bureaucracy of the American military presence throughout the world.

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