Ward Churchill still on the job market

From Fox/AP: "A judge refused Tuesday to reinstate a University of Colorado professor who was fired on plagiarism charges after he likened some Sept. 11 terrorist attack victims to a Nazi leader... If it stands, the ruling means Ward Churchill cannot return to the classroom even though he won a lawsuit in April arguing that his firing was politically motivated."

Warning Prof. Churchill! Endowments have crashed, the American university sector isn't well: now's not the time to be an unemployed lecturer...!

28 palaces: Because I'm worth it!

The National Security Archive has got hold of some fascinating transcripts of quite a few interrogations conducted by the FBI with Saddam Hussein in 2004. Of course, any really juicy contemporary stuff is either redacted or unreleased, so the documents primarily focus on interviews related to the history of Iraq and the region.

Amongst other things, the interviews reveal how dictators justify their rule to themselves. The February 15 report reads, "Hussein advises that he considers himself a revolutionary, not a politician. In both 1968 and 1974, he asked the Party to allow him to be excused from his official position. However, the Party refused his request." I wonder what the consequences would have been for the party hierarchy if they'd accepted his offer!

Similarly, on May 10, Hussein remarks how he does not require an extravagant lifestyle. "Hussein was then question on the number of palaces and their extravagant nature," the interrogator wryly reports. "Hussein stated that the palaces belong to the nation and not to one person." An argument that's been around for at least as long as there's been kings squatting on the necks of servile labour.

The line between tragedy and farce

Yesterday’s pompous airborne standoff between the circling president Zelaya and the Honduran army which was blocking his landing had all the drama of a classic moment in history without the accompanying sense of meaning. Reporters seem, unsurprisingly, unable to work out its political consequences. Ever since the remarkable events surrounding the failed coup attempt against Chávez, Latin American crises have tacked dangerously close to the absurd in their taste for the dramatic, and yesterday was no different. What would have happened if Zelaya had landed, anyway? The wannabe government would have arrested him. Zelaya says that if he had a parachute, he would have jumped from the plane. I’m sure they had parachutes...! On both sides, showmanship of the worst order.

With the Liberal party, Church, business elites and army lined up against the erstwhile president, and the OAS, World Bank, EU, United States and most of the rest of Latin America condemning Micheletti and Co., it’s tempting to see this as a crisis of Honduras’ elites against the world. The decision to kick Honduras out of the OAS (the first time something like this has happened since Cuba) is pretty remarkable. The “ousters” have dramatically failed in the public relations battle; few people in the rest of the world seem to see these events as anything other than a straightforward coup; sanctions are beginning to be implemented from the international community; the danger to democracy is seen as coming from the army.

It’s extremely difficult to see how the administration could back down and allow Zelaya to return, but it’s equally hard to imagine Honduras being able to resist the combined might of the rest of the continent for too long, especially as the risk of regional escalation will ultimately ensure US-backed engagement of some sort or another in the absence of a resolution. One thing that is clear, though: this conflict will continue to unfold in performance as both sides attempt to press their claims through overblown public action.

Constitutional crisis in Honduras

(Apologies, this is a little behind the times but I've been away the past couple of days...)

There’s a strange parallelism to the claims currently being offered by both sides in the complex events that are unfolding in Honduras.

Supporters of the “ousters” – the term that the international media is preferring as a more neutral equivalent to coup plotters – claim that (Ex?-)President Manuel Zelaya, “Mel”, was attempting to reform the Honduran constitution to allow him to serve multiple terms and thus establish himself effectively as a constitutional dictator. Designed to limit this classic tendency toward the perpetuation of personalist rule in Latin America, the Honduran constitution explicitly prohibits the alteration of the framework of elections to permit presidents to seek re-election. The key clause is article 239 of the constitution, which reads:

“El ciudadano que haya desempeñado la titularidad del Poder Ejecutivo no podrá ser Presidente o Designado.

“El que quebrante esta disposición o proponga su reforma, así como aquellos que lo apoyen directa o indirectamente, cesarán de inmediato en el desempeño de sus respectivos cargos, y quedarán inhabilitados por diez años para el ejercicio de toda función pública.”

"A citizen who has held the title of Chief Executive cannot be President or Designate.

"Anyone who breaks this rule or proposes its reform, or those who support either directly or indirectly the same, will immediately cease to hold their respective offices, and will be banned for 10 years from the exercise of all public functions." (With apologies for dodgy translation.)

Thus, the coup was not a coup, it was the legitimate exercise of constitutional power by Congress and the Supreme Court, who controlled and ordered the military. This argument is, of course, rather undermined by the fact that in the process of supposedly defending the constitution, the military set about violating several other due process clauses of the same constitution (against protestors and supporters of Zelaya, not to mention Zelaya himself, who was jetted out of the country under quite peculiar circumstances).

Meanwhile, the left claims Mel that was operating entirely legally in his efforts to reform the constitutional structure of Honduran government to allow for multiple terms of office. At Counterpunch, Alberto Vallente Thorensen admits that the article says what it says but claims (in my view rather Aesopianly) that Mel was not violating this rule since he was trying to rewrite the constitution, not amend it.


Thus we have the classic elements of a constitutional crisis: both sides claim to be the legitimate parties and the other to be violating the due process of law. Meanwhile, both sides attack each other with what are the deeper, underlying issues: the right accusing the left of being stooges of Chávez and Castro; the left accusing the right of operating as proxies for an elite who will sell out their country to the United States (“vendepatrias”), and noting that many of the military leaders, rather unsurprisingly, have close connections with the US School of Americas / WHINSEC apparatus.


Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton has been going through some rather peculiar contortions, informally accusing the “ousters” of being coup-plotters but not formally saying so, since that would require the US to implement sanctions against the nation. It seems that the Obama administration is unhappy with the precedent that the removal of a Latin American president by the military would set, and afraid of the impact it might have on perceptions of US power in the region (both amongst those who think the US is behind everything and those who think the US is no longer a force to be reckoned with), but not entirely supportive of an individual who has been a regular critic of the US under both Bush and Obama.

Whatever one thinks about the question of blame, one thing is undoubtedly clear. Whilst arguably imposed for the best of reasons, Article 239 has proven to be badly constructed and dangerous. Not in placing term limits; this, given the context, seems an eminently reasonable thing (and I’ve elsewhere criticised Chavez for leading the effort to undermine constitutional legitimacy rather than establish a political tradition outside of personal rule). No, the problem is with the sanction. The requirement for the “immediate removal” of the advocate of constitutional reform provide no opportunity for discussion, investigation or a process of impeachment, which – as the US model shows – allow for a thorough airing of views, and a degree of public (and judicial) examination of the issues before any irrevocable decision is made. Whilst it seems at times that this only builds tension, actually it allows groups to engage in public debate before any final or shattering decision is made. Here, the speed of the action has inevitably left massive doubts about the real motives behind the action and the guilt or otherwise of the president, and it’s now extremely difficult to see how either Zelaya can be reinstated or broader violence averted.

It’s notable that impeachment crises in the US have as often been effective without reaching their end as they were in the final vote. In fact, look at the Clinton impeachment process: the final vote settled nothing that had not already been determined during the trial by media. Often we consider this a bad thing, but actually it allows for a degree of public engagement that this kind of judicial fiat in Honduras precludes.

It seems the best thing that the acting government could do now would be to try to reach some kind of accord which would allow for the safe return of and a trial of Zelaya and a more neutral adjudication of the issues at stake, perhaps under OAS auspices or similar. "If we were able to get to a ... status quo that returned to the rule of law and constitutional order within a relatively short period of time, I think that would be a good outcome," Clinton says (rightly, but with no clear indication of how to get there). Unfortunately, the country is so deeply polarised, a neutral adjudication seems far from probable. Obama will be even more of a magician than I think he is if he is able to wangle the Central American republics out of this one...

Wait and see

Why do I keep agreeing with the president? Take this commentary on Iran from the same CNBC interview in which Obama proved there were no flies on him (hat tip: Sullivan):

Well, I think first of all, it's important to understand that although there is amazing ferment taking place in Iran, that the difference between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual policies may not be as great as has been advertised. Either way, we were going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been hostile to the United States, that has caused some problems in the neighborhood and is pursuing nuclear weapons. And so we've got long-term interests in having them not weaponize nuclear power and stop funding organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas. And that would be true whoever came out on top in this election.

The second thing that I think's important to recognize is that the easiest way for reactionary forces inside Iran to crush reformers is to say it's the US that is encouraging those reformers. So what I've said is, "Look, it's up to the Iranian people to make a decision. We are not meddling." And, you know, ultimately the question that the leadership in Iran has to answer is their own credibility in the eyes of the Iranian people. And when you've got 100,000 people who are out on the streets peacefully protesting, and they're having to be scattered through violence and gunshots, what that tells me is the Iranian people are not convinced of the legitimacy of the election. And my hope is that the regime responds not with violence, but with a recognition that the universal principles of peaceful expression and democracy are ones that should be affirmed. Am I optimistic that that will happen? You know, I take a wait-and-see approach. Either way, it's important for the United States to engage in the tough diplomacy around those permanent security concerns that we have—nuclear weapons, funding of terrorism. That's not going to go away, and I think it's important for us to make sure that we've reached out.

Still, let's be clear about what Obama's saying here, so there are no illusions if it comes to another Tienanmen. "Nuclear weapons, funding of terrorism," not democracy, is the government priority in Iran right now, whatever the American people might be wishing for.

Obama channels ghost of Mr. Miyagi

From BBC news site

Krugman likes us!

I'm sure I'm not the only Brit who has been following with interest the expressions of mild enthusiasm that global econopundit in chief, Paul Krugman, has expressed towards our sceptered isle over recent months. So, I'm also sure I'm not the only one who was interested to read Krugman's interview with Will Hutton in this weekend's Observer. In it, Krugman reiterates his view that the Brown-Darling early stimulus package combined with significant currency depreciation places Britain in a comparatively strong place to exit the recession ahead of continental Europe, whilst the dependence of otherwise solid industrial economies (Germany and elsewhere) on exports to the crunch-hit world makes them more vulnerable than their relative isolation from the subprime crisis might have initially suggested.

So much for the end of the Anglo-Saxon model. This view will perhaps be a surprise to anyone who reads the British press only, in which the UK's overdependence on the financial sector is often dwelt upon to suggest we're in a much deeper hole than the rest of the continent. (Though, of course, these two views are not strictly exclusive.)

Krugman's enthusiasm for Britain may have a solid basis in fact - only time will tell - but I suspect it also reflects his expectations for the next eighteen months in American politics. In the same interview, he talks up the possibility of a second stimulus package in the US, arguing that the major economic figures in the Obama administration (Summers, Geithner, Romer) are all ready to consider such a measure if the economy doesn't rebound rapidly this year. "You know, the buzz I'm getting is that a second-round stimulus might well come on the agenda," he says. But Krugman must know well that a second stimulus would precipitate the mother of all battles with the newly fiscally conservative GOP rump. With Britain several months ahead in the process (thanks to America having to wait for Obama to take office before being able to act decisively), even tentative signs of green shoots in the economy 'over here' might end up providing a useful piece of evidence for the big spenders to point to 'over there'.

Meanwhile, with Brown seemingly destined to lose in next year's election and the Tories committed to sweeping cuts in spending, it may be that these lessons are not learned on the side of the pond in which they were actually put in place. It will be a great irony if Brown's last days in office see his policies gain greater credit abroad than they do at home.

US and Iran

After Obama's explicit acknowledgement of the US' role in unseating Mossadegh during his recent Cairo speech and his repeated declarations of his intention to open a new phase in US-Iranian relations, it is going to be interesting to watch how the White House continues to react to the fallout from the Iranian election. Joe Biden has told NBC that the government has concerns about the outcome and the post-election imprisonment of protestors. But not only was this comment matched by a reiteration of the government's willingness to talk to the Iranian leadership, the fact that it was Biden, rather than Obama, might also be considered significant - a VP complaining inherently being a softer blow than a direct statement from the President.

Biden's comments are worthing parsing from an Iranian perspective. "Talks with Iran are not a reward for good behavior. They are only a consequence if the president makes a judgment it's in the best interest of the United States of America to talk with the Iranian regime," Biden stated. "Our interests are the same before the election as after the election, and that is we want them to cease from seeking a nuclear weapon and having one in his possession and secondly to stop supporting terror," he said. Read this another way, and Biden is explicitly not saying that it is an administration priority to see free and fair democratic elections in Iran.

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Of course, if you ask the administration, they'll say they want both democracy and diplomacy. But coming to an agreement with the theocracy over Iraq, Afghanistan and nuclear weapons lies in tension with an aggressive policy of democracy promotion, since the latter is inherently antagonistic to the clerical leadership.

A stronger, more negative reaction to the stolen election - as one would have undoubtedly have seen from the Bush administration - would weaken the possibility of secret talks making any progress. It would also provide a useful image of an interfering American empire for Ahmedinejad to exploit when trying to legitimate his new term of office. But, on the other hand, not reacting creates a problem for a president who has the hopes of millions pinned on him as an ally of democracy in the Middle East. If the violence continues it will become increasingly difficult for Obama to stay out of this issue.

The sound of your own voice

Stanley Fish on Obama's shift from the 'we' to the 'I'... (NY Times). Inevitable product of actually having power, or a sign that the Big Man is getting too much love from the world?

Obama’s Cairo Speech: Actions versus Words

Some responses were always going to be predictable. For instance, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei replied, “The nations of this part of the world... deeply hate America. Even if they give sweet and beautiful [speeches] to the Muslim nation that will not create change. Action is needed.”

Leaving the irony to one side that the American right and the Ayatollah share a belief that Obama is all mouth and no trousers, let’s just think about this question of action versus words for a moment. It’s easy to try, since Obama laid out the items in his speech with his usual numerical precision.

1. Iraq, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda

Obama says: “We do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We see no military -- we seek no military bases there. It is agonizing for America to lose our young men and women. It is costly and politically difficult to continue this conflict. We would gladly bring every single one of our troops home if we could be confident that there were not violent extremists in Afghanistan and now Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans as they possibly can. But that is not yet the case.”

Actions: In 2005, John McCain called for the establishment of permanent military bases in Afghanistan. According to Wikipedia, “In mid-March, 2005, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers told reporters in Kabul that the U.S. Defense Department was studying the feasibility of such permanent military bases. At the end of March, the U.S. military announced that it was spending $83-million on its two main air bases in Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base north of Kabul and Kandahar Air Field in the south of the country.”

On the one hand, as part of the surge in Afghanistan, reports are that the US is building “two huge new bases” in Helmand and Zabul provinces. Whether this is a prelude to a longer term withdrawal or not, it seems unlikely that Muslims (or others in the region) will take this a sign that the US has no long term aspiration to maintain a military presence in the country.

On the other hand, though, Obama is pushing ahead with withdrawal from Iraq, closure of Guantanamo and has prohibited torture of detainees.

Conclusion: If Obama can deliver, this will amount to a major promise fulfilled in the Middle East, but it seems hard to believe that he can avoid the appearance of long term military aspirations in Afghanistan and Pakistan given the military approach he is taking there.

2. Israel/Palestine

Obama says: “The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.”

Actions: The roadmap for peace called for a complete freezing of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, including “natural growth” – meaning building new housing within existing settlements. Yet between 2002 and 2006, the number of Jewish settlers in West Bank settlements rose by more than 40,000.

Reports today have been fed to the press claiming that the Bush administration privately agreed to parse the meaning of natural growth in the original roadmap agreement. “Not everything is written down,” a former Bush official was recorded saying by the New York Times. The report goes on: “He and others said that Israel agreed to the road map and to move ahead with the removal of settlements and soldiers from Gaza in 2005 on the understanding that settlement growth could continue.”

In his recent meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Obama explicitly reiterated the commitment to halting the growth of Israeli settlements. "I've said very clearly to the Israelis both privately and publicly that a freeze on settlements, including natural growth, is part of those obligations,” he told NPR (source: Reuters). Netanyahu immediately rejected the call.

Conclusion: This appears to mark a serious effort by the Obama administration to start holding the Israelis to their side of the roadmap. Whether this will be enough to restart the peace process is an entirely different matter.

3. Nuclear proliferation

Obama says: “But it is clear to all concerned that when it comes to nuclear weapons, we have reached a decisive point. This is not simply about America's interests. It's about preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path.”

Actions: Obama has repeatedly offered to begin negotiations without preconditions on this matter with Iran, a major difference to the preceding administration. The statement in the Cairo speech that “any nation -- including Iran -- should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” is presumably another not-so-subtle wink along these lines.

Conclusion: Offers much potential for progress, but it takes two to tango. At least in part, this matter is dependent upon the unclear strategic goals of the Iranian government. Can some form of security guarantee obviate the need for status and power offered by nuclear weaponry?

4. Democracy

Obama says: “So no matter where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people sets a single standard for all who would hold power: You must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place the interests of your people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party. “

Actions: Not much that I've seen to date.

Conclusion: This is a central problem for American strategy in the Middle East, one that was repeatedly exposed during the Cold War as the United States concluded throughout the world that its geopolitical needs overrode any fundamental commitment to democracy. Since then, democracy promotion has become a much more central part of the US foreign policy infrastructure. But is it really conceivable that Egypt and Saudi Arabia can be pushed towards genuine multi-party democracies and open societies without producing the kind of political instability that US foreign policy leaders will baulk at?

5. Religious freedom

Obama says: “People in every country should be free to choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the soul.”

Actions: Zakat, the Muslim equivalent of tithing, has been damaged by restrictions of the flow of money to Muslim regions introduced as counter-terrorism measures following September 11.

Conclusion: The president will get a great deal of credit for recognizing the resonance of this issue, and he seems committed to clarifying the rules so as to maintain restrictions on funding Hamas, Hizballah, etc. but at the same time reopen zakat networks.

His statement on defending the right of Muslim women to wear the Hijab will also presumably go down well. But what about religious freedom and diversity in Iraq, which has taken a substantial step backwards since the invasion? And what implications are we to expect from his reference to “Maronites in Lebanon or the Copts in Egypt”? As yet unclear.

6. Women’s rights

Obama says: “I do not believe that women must make the same choices as men in order to be equal, and I respect those women who choose to live their lives in traditional roles. But it should be their choice. And that is why the United States will partner with any Muslim-majority country to support expanded literacy for girls, and to help young women pursue employment through micro-financing that helps people live their dreams.”

Actions:  Nothing I've seen to date.

Conclusion: Too early to tell. But this undoubtedly marks a faultline where Obama will have to risk alienating potential Muslim allies if he is serious.

7. Economic development

Obama says: “But all of us must recognize that education and innovation will be the currency of the 21st century -- and in too many Muslim communities, there remains underinvestment in these areas. I'm emphasizing such investment within my own country. And while America in the past has focused on oil and gas when it comes to this part of the world, we now seek a broader engagement.”

Actions: Obama announced “a new corps of business volunteers to partner with counterparts in Muslim-majority countries ... a Summit on Entrepreneurship ... a new fund to support technological development in Muslim-majority countries ... centers of scientific excellence in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia ...  new science envoys to collaborate on programs that develop new sources of energy, create green jobs, digitize records, clean water, grow new crops ... a new global effort with the Organization of the Islamic Conference to eradicate polio ... we will also expand partnerships with Muslim communities to promote child and maternal health.”

Conclusion: In the long term, such economic diplomacy has the potential to be one of the most powerful ways of improving America’s relationship with the Middle East and the Muslim world. But it will take a sustained commitment over a generation before it will have major diplomatic ramifications.

Summing up

Looking at the points item by item, it's clear that the record to date of the Obama administration, and the potential offered by his policies in the region are perhaps mixed. Obama’s ambitious agenda is certainly not without pitfalls – Iran, the roadmap and the surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan being clearly the most risky elements. There is still plenty of opportunity for the wheels to come off the wagon.

That said, Obama can already point to a record has produced meaningful change, not to mention a set of policies that offer the real possibility of further delivery in the next two to three years. Compared to the hectoring, abusiveness, and backsliding that comprised the illusion of policy by the past administration, this is an enormous shift in the role of the United States in the Muslim world. The idea that defenders of the Bush legacy and enemies of the Western system can accuse Obama of simply being about ‘words’ is, therefore, ridiculous.